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Rocky Mountain High: The Impact of Federal 
Guidance to Banks on the Marijuana Industry 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
A range of disparate viewpoints exists concerning the efficacy, 
necessity and ethicality of the criminalization of marijuana in the United 
States. Twenty-three states and the District of Columbia have legalized 
the use of marijuana to some extent.1 Under federal law, the Controlled 
Substances Act (“CSA”) prohibits the manufacturing, distribution or 
dispensing of marijuana.2 Despite the CSA, figures in popular media 
increasingly admit to and even boast about their “medical use” 
(frequently treated as a political fiction) or recreational use of the 
substance.3 With a majority of Americans now supporting legalization,4 
the end to marijuana prohibition could become reality. Despite federal 
law to the contrary, the states that have decriminalized or legalized 
marijuana continue to see enormous growth in state-sanctioned 
marijuana-businesses.5 These budding markets have contributed huge 
revenues to the state coffers.6 However, until federal legislation steps in 
to build a uniform regulatory structure concerning its use and 
distribution, several sizeable hurdles remain for those businesses that  
are legally permitted at the state level to trade grass for cash.  One of the 
 
1. Medical Marijuana Pros and Cons, PROCON.ORG, 
http://medicalmarijuana.procon.org/view.resource. php?resourceID=000881 (last visited 
Oct. 5, 2014). 
2. Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2012). 
3. 2013 Top 50 Most Influential Marijuana Users, MARIJUANA POL’Y PROJECT, 
http://www.mpp.org/outreach/top-50-marijuana-users-list.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2014). 
4. Art Swift, For the First Time, Americans Favor Legalizing Marijuana, GALLUP 
(Oct. 22, 2013), http://www.gallup.com/poll/165539/first-time-americans-favor-legalizing- 
marijuana.aspx. 
5. Bill Briggs, Pot Legalizations Push U.S. Toward Weed Business Boom, NBC NEWS 
(Nov. 8, 2014), http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/legal-pot/pot-legalizations-push-u-s- 
closer-weed-business-boom-n243861. 
6. Patrick Johnsson, How Legal Marijuana is Reshaping State Economies, CHRISTIAN 
SCI. MONITOR, (Nov. 7, 2014), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Society/2014/1107/How- 
legal-marijuana-is-reshaping-state-economies-video; Aaron Smith, Colorado Stash: $184m 
in Marijuana Taxes, CNN MONEY (Feb. 20, 2014, 2:25 PM), 
http://money.cnn.com/2014/02/20/news/economy/ marijuana-taxes-colorado/. 
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most exigent of these hurdles is just that: cash. Financial institutions are 
reluctant to deal with marijuana-related businesses because of the  risk 
of prosecution under the Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”).7 Recent guidance 
by the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”)8 and the 
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) provides little relief from these risks.9 
This Note considers the implications of these recent federal 
guidelines issued to financial institutions with respect to their freedom  
to do business with the state-sanctioned marijuana industry. It also 
discusses whether viable legal alternatives might be available to allow 
growth in the burgeoning marijuana markets while still remaining 
faithful to the federal government’s position regarding marijuana as a 
dangerous drug worthy of prohibition. This Note attempts to balance 
competing economic and governmental interests in an emerging  
industry that continues to evolve amid a tumultuous national landscape. 
This Note argues that current guidelines are excessively onerous for 
financial institutions and without greater flexibility, state-sanctioned 
marijuana businesses will not have access to vital financial services.10 
Furthermore, without some change in the existing structure, the 
problems associated with all-cash businesses will continue for  
marijuana businesses operating legally under state law.11 The exclusion 
of valuable tax revenue from government coffers and investment capital 
 
7. Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act of 1970 (Bank Secrecy Act), 
Pub. L. No. 91-508, § 202, 84 Stat. 1118, 1118 (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 5311 
(2012)) (requiring banks and financial institutions to facilitate the detection and prevention 
of money laundering); Reginald J. Brown et al., New Guidance on Financial Services and 
Marijuana-Related        Businesses,        WILMER HALE (Feb.        20,        2014), 
http://www.wilmerhale.com/pages/publicationsandnewsdetail.aspx?NewsPubId=107374234 
14. 
8. “FinCEN is a bureau of the United States Department of the Treasury. FinCEN’s 
mission is to safeguard the financial system from illicit use and combat money laundering 
and promote national security through the collection, analysis, and dissemination of 
financial intelligence and strategic use of financial authorities.” What We Do, FINCEN.GOV 
(Feb. 6, 2015), http://www.fincen.gov/about_fincen/wwd/. 
9. FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, GUIDANCE: 
BSA EXPECTATIONS REGARDING MARIJUANA-RELATED BUSINESSES (Feb. 14, 2014), 
available at http://www.fincen.gov/statutes_regs/guidance/pdf/FIN-2014-G001.pdf 
[hereinafter FINCEN GUIDANCE]. 
10. See infra Parts III & IV. 
11. See John B. Stephens, Pot Shops Shunned By Banks Haul in the Cash, USA TODAY 
(Aug. 31, 2014), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2014/08/31/pot- 
marijuana-industry/13628491/. Jennifer Waller, a Colorado Bankers  Association  senior 
vice president, explains that the FinCEN guidance “just set up this compliance scheme that’s 
impossible to follow and reiterated that you could still be prosecuted even if you’re doing 
everything under the memo . . . .” Id. 
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from the marketplace these businesses generate will also persist.12 
This Note proceeds in five parts. Part II provides a brief 
background on the recently issued FinCEN guidance concerning 
provision of banking services to marijuana businesses.13 Part III  
explains that the onus the guidance places on the banks essentially make 
the formation of business relationships with marijuana businesses 
impracticable.14 Part IV specifically discusses the requirement for 
“suspicious activity reports” and the process that is involved in 
submitting them to remain in compliance with FinCEN’s guidelines.15 
Part V contemplates the problems inherent in “all cash” businesses—the 
structure to which the state-legalized marijuana industry is relegated— 
and how states have attempted to reduce some of these hazards in the 
absence of large-scale offerings of financial services from depository 
institutions.16 Finally, Part VI concludes with some possible legislative 
solutions.17 
II. BACKGROUND 
 
Under the current federal regulatory scheme, marijuana qualifies 
as a Schedule I substance with “no currently accepted medical use” and 
a “high potential for abuse.”18 The conflict between state and federal  
law on the subject represents a seemingly intractable federalism  
problem in states where marijuana is legal.19 The official position of the 
federal government conflicts with its willingness and ability to deploy 
 
12. See Jacob Sullum, Marijuana Money Is Still a Pot of Trouble for Banks, FORBES 
(Sept. 18, 2014), available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/jacobsullum/2014/09/18/local- 
banks-terrified-by-friendly-neighborhood-marijuana-merchants/ (explaining that the IRS 
suggested, in a recent tax dispute, that marijuana businesses could pay taxes in cash through 
indirect electronic methods—methods that may still qualify as money laundering). 
13. See FINCEN GUIDANCE, supra note 9; see also infra, Part II. 
14. See infra, Part III. 
15. Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Att’y Gen., to U.S. Att’ys (Aug. 29, 
2013) [hereinafter Cole Memo], available  at 
http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/3052013829132756857467.pdf (guidance 
regarding marijuana enforcement); see infra Part IV. 
16. Keith Coffman, Colorado Lawmakers OK Co-Op Banking Option for Marijuana 
Sellers, REUTERS (May 8, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/08/us-usa- 
marijuana-colorado-idUSBREA3M27X20140508; see infra Part V. 
17. See infra Part VI. 
18. DRUG     ENFORCEMENT     ADMIN.,    DRUG     SCHEDULES     (2014),    available    at 
http://www.dea.gov/druginfo/ds.shtml. 
19. See Robert A. Mikos, Marijuana at the Crossroads: Article: Medical Marijuana 
and the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 89 DENV. U. L. REV. 997 (2012). 
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resources to enforce the prohibition of marijuana in states where it has 
been legalized.20 The federal government must allocate its resources for 
enforcement and prosecution under federal law to the most pressing 
cases.21 While the federal ban on marijuana might prove to have bite in 
individual cases, overall, it has proven “largely toothless” in curtailing 
state regulations that contradict it.22 While direct regulation has not 
proven to impede the progress of the state-sanctioned marijuana 
businesses, indirect regulation is now proving effective.23 Specifically, 
indirect regulation restricting access to banking presents a significant 
burden for marijuana business owners.24 The most pressing problem in 
the day-to-day lives of marijuana business owners is what to do with the 
money.25 Without a uniform structure to rely on, banks have been more 
than a little reluctant to provide financial services to marijuana 
businesses for fear of federal prosecution.26 
Until banks make a move toward opening their doors to 
marijuana distributors and vendors, these entrepreneurs will be left to 
manage large quantities of cash while also running businesses that were, 
until very recently, criminal.27 Without a secure means to store and  
make use of their income, proprietors of marijuana businesses remain 
vulnerable to criminal threats.28 Without access to the banking and 
financial system, the cash produced from the state-sanctioned marijuana 
industry is unproductive, when it could be made to work for the good of 
the economy at large if deposited into our financial system. Cash is 
difficult to track, it earns no interest, it is problematic to invest, and it is 
exceedingly difficult to accurately tax.29 
Thus, the current state of affairs is a conflict between federal  
and  state  law.    The  federal  prohibition  is  rarely  enforced  against 
 
 
20. Id. 
21.    Id. at 1003. 
22.    Id. at 998. 
23. Julie Andersen Hill, Banks, Marijuana, and Federalism, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 
44 (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 2). 
24. Id. 
25. See Stephens, supra note 11. 
26. Id. 
27. Id. 
28. Id. 
29. Matt Ferner, House Votes to Allow Banking Access for Marijuana Businesses, 
HUFFINGTON     POST (July 16, 2014, 5:15 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com 
/2014/07/16/house-marijuana-banking_n_5592620.html. 
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individuals that follow contradictory state law.30 In the midst of under- 
enforcement, the federal government chooses to regulate the state- 
sanctioned businesses indirectly through their access to financial 
services.31 To soften the edges of these contradictions, however, the 
federal government has indicated that it has certain priorities under the 
CSA that it emphasizes for prosecution.32 
On August 29, 2013, the Department of Justice issued guidance 
to U.S. Attorneys (the “Cole Memo”) to use their enforcement resources 
to prosecute marijuana violations of the CSA only when the conduct 
interferes with one of the priorities identified.33 Deputy Attorney 
General Cole issued “Guidance Regarding Marijuana Related Financial 
Crimes,” on February 14, 2014.34 The Deputy Attorney General 
reiterated the Cole Memo Priorities and stated that in determining 
whether to charge individuals or institutions with violations of the 
money laundering statutes, the unlicensed money remitter statute, and 
the BSA based on marijuana-related violations of the CSA, prosecutors 
should also apply the Cole Memo Priorities.35 The same day, FinCEN 
issued its own guidance detailing the prioritization of prosecutions of 
offenses violating relevant federal banking law.36 
While these efforts were intended to calm the banking system’s 
anxiety over developing relationships with marijuana-related businesses 
in those states with legalized marijuana, none of this guidance provided 
comfort to financial institutions in dealing with the newly-legalized 
businesses.37 Larger banks are unwilling to expose themselves to the 
risks attached to the marijuana business despite federal assurances that 
they will avoid prosecution if they comply with the relevant 
guidelines.38 Smaller banks, while on the whole adopting a similar  
stance to their larger counterparts, will occasionally form working 
relationships   with   marijuana   businesses   in   accordance   with   the 
 
30. Hill, supra note 23, at 2. 
31. Id. 
32. See Cole Memo, supra note 14, at 1. 
33. Id.; see infra Part III. 
34. Cole Memo, supra note 14, at 1. 
35. Cole Memo, supra note 14, at 4. 
36. See FINCEN GUIDANCE, supra note 9. 
37. Serge F. Kovaleski, U.S. Issues Marijuana Guidelines for Banks, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 
14, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/15/us/us-issues-marijuana-guidelines-for- 
banks.html?_r=0. 
38. Id. 
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procedures set out by FinCEN.39 However, these relationships may  
result in the larger banks becoming exposed to the risks associated with 
marijuana businesses through their relationships with these smaller 
institutions.40 To increase the banks’ comfort level with forming 
relationships with marijuana businesses, there is a need for greater 
clarity and a regulatory structure that all financial institutions can make 
workable.41 The current guidelines do not provide the assurances or 
comprehensive procedures that practically all banks view as a necessary 
prerequisite to doing business with the marijuana industry.42 
III. “MORE WHAT YOU’D CALL GUIDELINES THAN ACTUAL RULES” 
 
In Disney’s 2003 film Pirates of the Caribbean: The Curse of 
the Black Pearl, one of the most famous scenes contains an exchange 
between Elizabeth Swann, an English aristocrat, and Hector Barbossa, 
captain of a cursed pirating vessel, the eponymous “Black Pearl.”43 
Swann negotiates with the pirates, led by Barbossa, who are in the 
process of laying siege to the city of Port Royal, over which Swann’s 
father is governor.44 As they make preparations to leave, Swann 
demands to be returned to the shore and attempts to invoke the “Pirate 
Code” to support her demand.45 Barbossa turns on her and replies, 
“First, your return to shore was not a part of our negotiations, nor our 
agreement, so I must do nothing. And secondly, you must be a pirate  
for the pirate code to apply, and you’re not. And thirdly, the Code is 
more what you’d call ‘guidelines’ than actual rules. Welcome aboard 
 
 
39. See Danielle Douglas, Banks Are Slowly Welcoming Legal Marijuana Dealers, 
WASH. POST (Aug. 12, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/banks- 
are-slowly-welcoming-legal-marijuana-dealers/2014/08/12/01c17960-225b-11e4-8593- 
da634b334390_story.html (explaining that, at the time this article was written, 105 banks 
had established relationships with marijuana-related businesses). 
40. Brett Wolf, Big U.S. Banks Seek New Clarity on Risks of Marijuana-Linked 
Accounts, REUTERS (Aug. 28, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/08/28/us-banks- 
moneylaundering-drugs-idUSKBN0GS2QB20140828. 
41. See Travis Nelson, Banks Are Dazed and Confused After Marijuana Guidance, 
LAW360 (Mar. 3, 2014), http://www.law360.com/articles/514588/banks-are-dazed-and- 
confused-after-marijuana-guidance. 
42. Kovaleski, supra note 37. 
43. PIRATES OF THE CARIBBEAN: THE CURSE OF THE BLACK PEARL (Walt Disney 
Pictures 2003). 
44. Id. 
45. Id. 
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the Black Pearl . . . .”46 
The same scenario faces the banking institutions from FinCEN’s 
“guidance” issued in 2014 for the provision of financial services to 
state-sanctioned marijuana businesses.47  Under the current structure,   
the guidance issued by FinCEN and the DOJ offers no substantial 
protections against the prohibitions of the BSA or marijuana 
enforcement under the CSA.48 Instead, the guidance only provides a 
“deprioritization” of prosecutions relating to the provision of financial 
services to state-sanctioned marijuana businesses so long as the  
financial entities conform to the outlined procedures.49 Without more 
substantial protections, banks that comply with the guidance may still  
be found in violation of money laundering statutes and may be 
prosecuted by the DOJ.50 In effect, a bank that attempts to invoke the 
FinCEN guidance may find immunity from prosecution excluded from 
its “negotiations,” or “agreement” with FinCEN and that the guidance 
operates as “guidelines” rather than rules that shield banks from 
penalties. 
The penalties facing banks include those contained in money 
laundering statutes. The “relevant provision of the Money Laundering 
Control Act reads, 
 
[w]hoever, knowing that the property involved in a 
financial transaction represents the proceeds of some 
form of unlawful activity, conducts or attempts to 
conduct such a financial transaction which in fact 
involves the proceeds of specified unlawful activity— 
(A) (i) with the intent to promote the carrying on of 
specified  unlawful  activity. . .  shall  be  sentenced  to a 
 
 
46. Id. 
47. Editorial, Feds Drag Feet on Banking Access for Marijuana Industry, SEATTLE 
TIMES, Aug. 26, 2014, at A9. 
48. See Cole Memo, supra note 15, at 2 (explaining that it is the customary practice of 
the DOJ to leave localized enforcement to local authorities when activity does not violate 
one of the stated priorities, but does not directly state that it will not exercise its prerogative 
to prosecute); see also FINCEN GUIDANCE, supra note 9 at 2 (stating only that FinCEN 
should “consider these enforcement priorities with respect to federal money laundering, 
unlicensed money transmitter, and BSA offenses predicated on marijuana-related violations 
of the CSA”). 
49. Cole Memo, supra note 15, at 2. 
50. Id. 
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fine of not more than $500,000 or twice the value of the 
property involved in the transaction, whichever is 
greater, or imprisonment for not more than twenty years, 
or both.51 
 
At the federal level, proceeds from marijuana businesses still 
represent “proceeds of some form of unlawful activity.”52 Simply put, 
income generated by state-sanctioned marijuana businesses is, in the 
eyes of the federal government, ill-gotten gains.53 Such income and 
profits derived from businesses generating it are subject to the penalties 
of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956 and 1957, which forbid “[e]ngaging in monetary 
transactions in property derived from specified unlawful activity.”54 
The FinCEN guidance and the Cole Memo, issued to  allow 
banks some freedom to deal specifically with businesses legalized under 
state law, did not remove this danger.55  Rather, the Cole Memo outlines 
a list of priorities for prosecution of marijuana-related crimes and 
instructs DOJ attorneys and law enforcement, that whether marijuana- 
related conduct violates one of these priorities should be instructive 
when considering prosecution.56 
The Cole Memo priorities include: 
 
(1) Preventing the  distribution  of marijuana  to minors; 
(2) Preventing revenue from the sale of marijuana from 
going to criminal enterprises, gangs, and cartels; (3) 
Preventing the diversion of marijuana from states where 
it is legal under state law in some form to other states; 
(4) Preventing state-authorized marijuana activity from 
being used as a cover or pretext for the trafficking of 
other illegal drugs or other illegal activity; (5)  
Preventing violence and the use of firearms in the 
cultivation and distribution of marijuana; (6) Preventing 
drugged driving and the exacerbation of other adverse 
 
51. Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1352(a)(1), 100 
Stat. 3207, 3207-18 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.A. § 1956(a)(1) (West 2013)). 
52. Id. 
53. Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (2012). 
54.    18 U.S.C.A. § 1957. 
55. Cole Memo, supra note 15, at 2. 
56. Id. 
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public health consequences associated with marijuana 
use; (7) Preventing the growing of marijuana on public 
lands and the attendant public safety and environmental 
dangers posed by marijuana production on public lands; 
and (8) Preventing marijuana possession or use on 
federal property.57 
 
Essentially, the guidance only provides that if the Cole Memo 
Priorities are not implicated in the course of a financial institution’s 
activities relating to a marijuana business, “prosecution may not be 
‘appropriate.’ ”58 This language is far too tepid to offer banks any 
assurance that they will evade federal criminal prosecution if they 
provide financial services to a marijuana business.59 The guidance also 
fails to provide any incentive to offer basic financial services to 
marijuana businesses.60 The FinCEN guidance, predicated on the Cole 
Memo, offers neither a firm guarantee of protection from prosecution 
nor a firm prohibition against federal retribution.61 The Cole Memo and 
the FinCEN guidance state that, although the DOJ and FinCEN do not 
wish to use their discretion to allocate their resources to the prosecution 
of banks serving businesses that are considered legal in their state, it 
does not prevent them from doing so.62 In accordance with this weak 
assurance, most banks have erred on the side of caution and refused to 
offer services to marijuana businesses.63 
Some smaller banks have voluntarily established relationships 
with state-sanctioned marijuana businesses, but the rate at which these 
relationships terminate appears to overshadow any such progress.64   The 
 
57. Id. 
58. Kovaleski, supra note 37. 
59. Id; see also Editorial, supra note 47 (statement of Don Childears, president of the 
Colorado Bankers Association) (“After a series of red lights, we expected this guidance to 
be a yellow one. This isn’t close to that.”). 
60. Id. 
61. See Nelson, supra note 41 (quoting the American Bankers Association) (“Because 
marijuana is illegal under federal statute, guidance alone isn’t enough. There’s a great deal 
of guidance that banks would want to see in terms of banking with these types of businesses 
but guidance alone doesn’t change the fundamental prohibition.”). 
62. Cole Memo, supra note 15, at 2. 
63. Stephens, supra note 11. (“ ‘The media was saying it was a green light,’ said  
Jenifer Waller, a Colorado Bankers Association senior vice president. ‘We said, “No, it 
continues to be a very solid red light; not even yellow, to be honest.” ’ ”). 
64. See Bruce Krasnow, New Banking Rules Create Tough Barriers for State’s 
Growing      Medical      Pot      Businesses,      INSURANCENEWS.NET       (Oct.      19,   2014), 
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willingness of smaller depository institutions to bear the risk presented 
by the possibility of federal prosecution causes headaches for the larger 
institutions that are not offering their services to marijuana businesses.65 
For example, the entanglement of funds traceable to sources within the 
state-sanctioned marijuana industry as they move from smaller banks to 
larger banks creates concerns for the larger banks that have been, on the 
whole, unwilling to engage with this growing industry.66 
Significantly, of the financial institutions that have elected to 
provide services to marijuana-related businesses, none have yet been 
subjected to any enforcement actions.67 As of August 12,  2014, 
however, only 105 U.S. financial institutions provided banking services 
to state-sanctioned marijuana businesses.68 These 105 financial 
institutions represent less than 1% of all banks and credit unions in the 
United States.69 Despite the relative dearth of participation, FinCEN 
maintains that the agency’s guidance accomplishes its purported aims  
by “facilitating access to financial services, while ensuring that this 
activity is transparent and the funds are going into regulated financial 
institutions.”70 Whatever FinCEN’s position, the widespread reluctance 
of banks indicates that the industry does not share the sentiment that the 
guidance is “facilitating access to financial services.” 
 
IV. SUSPICIOUS, SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY REPORTS 
 
The FinCEN guidance provides a regulatory structure for banks 
that  do  choose  to  establish  business  relationships  with  marijuana 
 
 
http://insurancenewsnet.com/oarticle/2014/10/18/new-banking-rules-create-tough-barriers- 
for-states-growing-medical-pot-business-a-569267.html#.VNYNjIupX8E (quoting Brian 
Kindle) (“[S]everal months later, the effect of that guidance remains hazy. Comments by 
FinCEN Director Jennifer Shasky Calvery indicate that while a small handful of institutions 
are providing services to the legal marijuana industry, many others have terminated 
relationships with customers tied to the marijuana trade.”). 
65. Wolf, supra note 40. 
66. Id. 
67. Or, at least, Jennifer Shasky Calvery, FinCEN Director, “was unaware” of any such 
prosecutions.  Kovaleski, supra note 37. 
68. Jennifer Shasky Calvery, Director, Fin. Crimes Enforcement Network, Remarks to 
Mid-Atlantic AML Conference (Aug. 12, 2014) (transcript available at 
http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/speech/html/20140812.html). 
69. Editorial, Marijuana Dispensaries Need Access to Banking System, BOSTON  
GLOBE, Sept. 9, 2014, at A12. 
70. Calvery, Remarks to Mid-Atlantic AML Conference, supra note 68. 
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businesses.71 If the deprioritization of federal  prosecution  does  not 
deter banks from offering their services, they may be dissuaded by the 
regulatory structure itself. The structure included in the FinCEN 
guidance enumerates processes related to “customer due diligence” and 
the issuing of “Suspicious Activity Reports” (“SARs”).72 These 
processes place major burdens on banks in addition to the already 
disconcerting lack of assurance against prosecution.73 
The FinCEN guidance requires that all banks first conduct 
“customer due diligence” before entering into any specific business 
relationship with a marijuana vendor.  “Due diligence” includes: 
 
(i) verifying with the appropriate state authorities 
whether the business is duly licensed and registered; (ii) 
reviewing the license application (and related 
documentation) submitted by the business for obtaining 
a state license to operate its marijuana-related business; 
(iii) requesting from state licensing and enforcement 
authorities available information about the business and 
related parties; (iv) developing an understanding of the 
normal and expected activity for the business, including 
the types of products to be sold and the type of  
customers to be served (e.g., medical versus recreational 
customers); (v) ongoing monitoring of publicly available 
sources for adverse information about the business and 
related parties; (vi) ongoing monitoring for suspicious 
activity, including for any of the red flags described in 
this guidance; and (vii) refreshing information obtained 
as part of customer due diligence on a periodic basis and 
commensurate with the risk.74 
 
FinCEN then asks banks to continue to monitor these clients and 
to use their judgment as to whether or not a client has violated one of  
the “Cole Memo Priorities.”75 
 
 
71. FINCEN GUIDANCE, supra note 9 at 2. 
72. Id. 
73. Hill, supra note 23, at 15–16. 
74. FINCEN GUIDANCE, supra note 9 at 2. 
75. Id.; see also supra Part III. 
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After moving through the process of “customer due diligence” 
and choosing to accept a customer account from a state-sanctioned 
marijuana business, a bank must then follow a process of filing SARs 
that applies regardless of the client’s compliance with the Cole Memo 
Priorities.76 “The obligation to file a SAR is unaffected by any state law 
that legalizes marijuana-related activity.”77 A financial institution is 
required to file a SAR if, consistent with FinCEN regulations, the 
financial institution “knows, suspects, or has reason to suspect” that any 
transaction involves proceeds from activity that the federal government 
designates as illegal, attempts to avoid liability by misrepresenting the 
source of such funds, is “designed to evade” BSA regulations or “lacks  
a business or apparent lawful purpose.”78 
The FinCEN regulatory scheme and federal law still treat 
marijuana-related activity as an illegal source of funds.79 Therefore, any 
financial institution beginning a relationship with a marijuana-related 
business must immediately file a “Marijuana Limited Suspicious 
Activity Report,” even if the relationship implicates none of the Cole 
Memo Priorities and the marijuana-related business has undergone the 
scrutiny of customer due diligence.80 These Marijuana Limited SARs 
identify the parties involved and state that the “filing institution is filing 
the [Marijuana Limited Suspicious Activity Report] solely because the 
subject is engaged in a marijuana-related business.”81 These Marijuana 
Limited SARs also require a bank’s assurance that “no additional 
suspicious activity has been identified,” beyond the fact that marijuana  
is involved.82 
After the initial SAR, FinCEN requires banks to file “continuing 
activity reports.”83 These reports, in addition to the information 
contained in the Marijuana Limited SARs, contain the amounts of 
deposits, withdrawals and transfers made by the account since the last 
SAR filing.84   The filing of “continuing activity reports” is an obligation 
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of ongoing “customer due diligence.”85 A “continuing activity report” 
must be filed within 120 days of the initial filing, and continue under 
that same timeframe.86 This will result in three “continuing activity 
report[s]” in a twelve-month period.87 
Conducting customer due diligence requires continued 
monitoring for “red flags.”88   The February FinCEN Guidance includes  
a non-exhaustive list of actions constituting “red flags.”89 If, in the 
course of conducting customer due diligence, an institution detects a 
possible violation of one of the Cole Memo Priorities, the institution 
must file a “Marijuana Priority” SAR.90 A SAR of this kind  must 
contain “comprehensive detail.”91 The FinCEN Guidance notes the 
following as relevant details to law enforcement includable in a 
“Marijuana Priority” SAR: the identifying information and addresses of 
the subject and “related parties, details and descriptions” of those 
policies which the financial institution suspects have violated, and dates, 
amounts and “other relevant details” of the financial transactions.92 
Finally, if a bank wishes to terminate a relationship with a marijuana- 
related business, it must file a “Marijuana Termination SAR” to indicate 
that it has done so in order to remain compliant with the relevant 
regulatory statutes.93 
Thus, if a depository institution wishes to enter into a 
relationship with a legitimate marijuana-related business, it must 
perform extensive background checks into the proposed client.94 The 
institution must closely monitor the client’s activity on a continuing 
basis while continually filing SARs concerning the business’ financial 
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86. Frequently Asked Questions Regarding the FinCEN Suspicious Activity Report, 
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transactions.95 The SARs must also include  what those  transactions 
may indicate.96 If any indication comes to the bank’s attention  that 
might suggest the violation of a prosecutorial priority, the bank must 
immediately terminate its relationship with that client.97 A misstep in 
any part of this process could incur significant penalties, including 
exposing the bank to the possibility of prosecution.98 Clearly, this 
extensive burden would not appeal to a financial institution. 
The SAR process is also full of bureaucratic redundancies. If  
the SAR process, as implemented, actually means to deter banks from 
supporting businesses that implicate one of the  enumerated 
prosecutorial priorities, the initial SAR filing is not essential to that end. 
If banks are charged with the ongoing monitoring and customer “due 
diligence,” and are required to notify the government at the first sign of 
possible infraction, the initial filing appears to serve no other purpose 
than to keep a registry for possible prosecution should FinCEN decide 
that it wishes to change its stance on deprioritization. The effect of the 
current system has chilled banking of marijuana businesses, because the 
federal government still views this activity as criminal.99 Even without 
actions violative of the emphasized prosecutorial priorities issued by 
FinCEN, the guidance implies that banks’ relationships with these 
businesses are “suspicious” by nature.100 The banks, in turn, have 
responded by becoming “suspicious” of their ability to extend services 
to these businesses unencumbered by the possibility of imminent 
prosecution.101 
Furthermore, the onerous requirements for continued monitoring 
and filing of the baseline SARs are unnecessary in light of  the 
provisions for “red flag” conduct. If the marijuana-related  business 
raises an issue that appears relevant to the prosecutorial priorities that 
FinCEN has emphasized, then a report must be filed.102 However, a 
constant stream of monitoring in the absence of such “red flags” is 
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burdensome.103 Requiring banks to follow such ponderous procedures 
does not more efficiently detect marijuana-related businesses that do 
implicate the Cole Memo Priorities. Additionally, requiring these 
procedures does not increase the probability of detecting marijuana- 
related businesses that run afoul of the priorities that the  government 
has a particularized interest in protecting. If the initial SAR and the 
continued submission of “Marijuana Limited” SARs were removed 
from the monitoring scheme and the “Marijuana Priority” and 
“Marijuana Termination” SARs remained, it might provide banks with 
more flexibility to enter into these relationships. If the regulatory 
scheme could be streamlined, it would not deprive the government of its 
right to prosecute those businesses operating outside of legitimate 
boundaries.104 Customer due diligence would, of course, still be 
required, but at a more manageable, less arbitrary level. The inclusion  
of these other procedures sets such a high regulatory bar that banks are 
sharply deterred from participating in relationships with marijuana 
businesses.105 
Regulators and lawmakers must afford stronger protections to 
banks in providing services to the marijuana industry, or the SAR 
process must be severely truncated, or both. Without either of these 
reforms, banks will continue to feel that they are being shortlisted for 
prosecution by providing lists of “adverse” clients beyond the normal 
financial regulatory protocols.106 Ultimately, legislation may be  the  
only firm solution to the trepidation that financial institutions feel in 
dealing with marijuana businesses.107 In the meantime, the softening of 
the regulatory protocols contained in the FinCEN guidance could ease 
some of the banks’ anxieties, but such protocol changes are still subject 
 
 
103. Brown et al., supra note 7. 
104. See Hill, supra note 23, at 18 (quoting FED. FIN. INST. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, 
BANK SECRECY ACT/ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING EXAMINATION MANUAL 9, 63–65 (2010) 
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implementing regulations is subject to a criminal fine of up to $250,000 or five years, or 
both.”). 
105. See Hill, supra note 23, at 46 (“[F]ederal financial regulators must set achievable 
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compliance with all federal and state law, institutions will continue to avoid the marijuana 
industry.”). 
106. Stephens, supra note 11. 
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to the possibility of quick turnover.108 This Note does not claim that  
there are no legitimate reasons for banks to provide information in cases 
where a reasonable cause for concern arises. Instead, it advocates for a 
compromise between sweeping permissiveness and cumbersome 
limitations that brand any such relationships as prima facie “suspicious” 
in nature. 
Even if additional protections and reduced SAR reporting 
materialize, larger financial institutions will likely still remain 
unconvinced to open their doors to marijuana businesses.109 The 
American Bankers Association (the “Association”), for example, has 
said that the problems inherent in the fundamental prohibition cannot be 
ameliorated by guidance alone.110 The Association did indicate that 
further and friendlier guidance might help to change the positions of 
banks, but that guidance remains subject to immediate change and, thus, 
cannot provide lasting assurance.111 While regulatory changes might 
provide some basis for movement on the issue, the only way that banks 
will feel completely shielded from the possibility of imminent 
prosecution is by a substantive change in the law.112 
Nonetheless, some modifications could ease the transition from 
total prohibition to the opening up of a burgeoning commercial market. 
As Congress inches toward aligning itself with the majority of 
Americans who support legalization of marijuana, there are several 
proposals    under  legislative   consideration.113 Coupled   with   an 
enervation of the stringency of the protocols outlined by FinCEN to 
remain consonant with the BSA and the relevant money laundering 
statutes, we could see a change in the hardline attitude the major banks 
have so far adopted toward conducting business with the marijuana 
industry. Legislative change is the Holy Grail for financial institutions  
to feel secure enough to offer services to the  marijuana industry.114  
Until   then,   a   softening   of   the   FinCEN   guidance   could   move 
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significantly in that direction.115 
V. CRIMINALS PREFER CASH, BUT MAY ACCEPT CREDIT UNIONS 
Without  access to  depository institutions and  banking services, 
the  marijuana  industry  is  largely  an  all-cash   business.116       All-cash 
income streams inevitably attract criminal activity, make state and 
federal tax enforcement difficult, and leave revenue and commodities 
produced by the industry outside of the larger marketplace where they 
could serve to foster economic viability on a greater scale.117 Though  
the businesses themselves operate legally at the state level, the 
unavailability of financial services forces many manufacturers and 
business owners to provide security for their own profits.118 Their cash  
is often stored in warehouses, in private residences, or on the business’ 
premises where it is secured only by conventional means available to  
the general public.119 A lack of access to the security of depository 
institutions forces some state-approved marijuana businesses to hire 
private security firms and to charter armored trucks to transport the  
large amounts of cash accrued by their operations.120  With  cash on 
hand, and limited options available for its secure storage, state-approved 
marijuana businesses are left vulnerable to theft, extortion, harassment, 
and substantially increased overhead.121 A lack of access to depository 
institutions also keeps the cash generated by marijuana-related activities 
from working as a more lucrative investment vehicle and makes  
accurate collection of tax more difficult.122 
In the absence of large-scale commercial financial services, 
some  states  that  have  legalized  marijuana-related  businesses  have 
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proposed state legislation that permits the use of financial 
cooperatives.123 These would essentially function as credit unions.124  
But even these measures are fraught with complications. One major 
complication is that the Federal Reserve would have to permit such 
financial cooperatives to accept credit cards and checks.125 
Under the Marijuana Financial Services Cooperatives Act (“Co- 
op Act”) passed May 7, 2014, by the Colorado Senate, the financial 
cooperatives would operate in a manner similar to credit unions.126 The 
co-ops, however, would not have a deposit insurance requirement and 
would be governed by the state’s financial services commissioner.127 
The financial cooperatives will be run by the co-op members and 
supervised by the state.128 While improving upon mass hoarding and 
transporting of physical cash, without the security offered by deposit 
insurance, such cooperatives might find themselves in the crosshairs of 
instability. Deposit insurance protects depositors in the event of  a 
bank’s failure.129 If the co-op were to fail, members’ deposits would not 
be protected in the same way.130 Without the safety net of deposit 
insurance, the “cannabis co-ops” mitigate only some of the problems 
associated with the “all-cash” nature of the current marijuana 
industry.131 
There are restrictions in place, peculiar to these so-called 
“cannabis co-ops” under the Co-op Act, that do little to mitigate the 
problems experienced by marijuana businesses in attaining financial 
services.132 First, incorporators of the co-ops, under the Colorado 
legislation, must provide the state financial services commissioner  with 
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written evidence of approval by the Federal Reserve Bank for access to 
the Federal Reserve System.133 Second, the bill states that, while 
subjected to taxation and outside of the protection of the FDIC, the 
“cannabis co-op” must “comply with all applicable requirements of 
federal law,” “file suspicious activity reports,” “conduct due diligence,” 
and “establish a customer identification policy.”134 In other words, the 
procedures, restrictions and flimsy protections offered by the FinCEN 
guidance apply with equal vigor to these “co-ops” despite the lack of an 
insurance benefit. Additionally, these co-ops are designated specifically 
to provide services to businesses that the federal government views as 
adverse clients supplying ill-gotten gains.135 If the political winds were 
to shift, these co-ops could be targets for prosecution and penalties. The 
so-called “cannabis credit co-op” must first apply to submit to the 
purview of the Federal Reserve System.136 Then the co-op must remain 
restricted by the very procedures that deter the banks from conducting 
the business they seek to conduct. Finally, co-ops must do all of this 
without many of the benefits offered by the infrastructure of a 
conventional depository institution. 
The powers of these co-ops are briefly outlined as follows: (1)  
to make loans to its members and other co-ops; (2) to make deposits in 
other state or national financial institutions that voluntarily  accepts 
those deposits; (3) to invest in obligations or securities guaranteed or 
insured by an agency of the United States, obligations of any state or 
territory of the United States, in shares of mutual funds or investment 
companies, stocks, bonds or other securities; (4) to acquire, through 
purchase or other lawful transactions, and hold the title to real and 
personal property; (5) to exercise such incidental powers as are 
necessary to enable it to carry on effectively the business for which it is 
incorporated; (6) to sell its own assets and purchase the assets of  
another co-op; and (7) to participate with other co-ops or financial 
organizations in making loans to co-op members.137 
On its face, the notion of a cannabis co-op sounds like precisely 
the  system  that  the  state-sanctioned marijuana  industry needs. It  is  a 
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starting point, but these powers are without much force on their own 
because the deposits made in other state or national financial institutions 
must be “voluntarily accept[ed].”138 Investments in shares of mutual 
funds or investment companies face essentially the same 
complication.139 Rather than circumventing the existing problems with 
the regulatory structure, the co-op schema merely redoubles them under 
a new, more specific banner.140 In order to participate in the larger 
financial markets, these co-ops would have to place their funds in the 
care of institutions that are unwilling to expose themselves to the 
liabilities associated with ill-gotten gains. While the benefits associated 
with access to loans, the facilitation of real property transactions and the 
diversion of physical cash into limited credit availability will likely 
alleviate some of the strain, the channeling of the proceeds of marijuana 
businesses into real economic contribution to the markets is not satisfied 
by these types of institutions. Without insurance or infrastructure, the 
criminal depletion of funds from co-ops or the potential for isolated 
panics are still very real concerns. 
Most of the powers granted to these new financial entities by the 
Co-op Act ring hollow and exacerbate a problem that the banks are 
facing in dealing with smaller financial institutions that have accepted 
funds from marijuana businesses.141 Specifically, larger financial 
institutions are uncertain of their risk of liability in accepting funds from 
smaller depository institutions,142 which would presumably include 
“cannabis credit co-ops” that deal with the marijuana vendors directly. 
For example, “if a marijuana business deposits money into an account at 
a bank which then wires funds to pay for supplies such as soil, seeds, or 
packaging, the banks handling the other side of the transactions need to 
know if they risk charges for lapses in their anti-money laundering 
programs, or even criminal money laundering.”143 
The FinCEN guidance issued in February is conspicuously 
unclear as to how to handle indirect activity.144 The guidance mentions 
that the institutions “may file” a report with authorities and should make 
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“risk-based” decisions in determining whether or not to process such 
transactions.145 Such language likely indicates that banks will continue 
to avoid direct transactions with marijuana-related businesses as well as 
indirect transactions with customers who are depositing money they 
received from marijuana-related activity.146 The lack of clarity 
concerning the problem of indirect banking relationships with marijuana 
businesses presents not only further doubts as to the major institutions’ 
willingness to involve themselves but also to the extent of the  efficacy 
of institutions such as the Colorado “cannabis credit co-ops.” At  
present, it is likely that such institutions’ powers will remain severely 
limited. From the information available in the bill, it appears they will 
be unable to accomplish much more than a diversion of cash into 
truncated credit, housed by what are functionally credit unions subject  
to the same federal guidelines as banks, but without the benefit of 
deposit   insurance.147 Without    more    substantial   reforms,   any 
participation in the larger financial system—despite what the Colorado 
legislation grants as “powers” to these co-ops—will be mostly titular. 
VI. THE GRASS IS ALWAYS GREENER ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE 
BELTWAY 
 
Amidst this gloomy forecast regarding the participation of 
marijuana-related businesses in the financial system, there are some 
legislative proposals currently under discussion. First is the Marijuana 
Businesses Access to Banking Act of 2013, which would create the 
blanket immunity that banking institutions are clamoring for to allow 
them the security they need to conduct business with marijuana-related 
enterprises.148 Second is the proposed Financial Services and General 
Appropriations Act of 2015, which contains an amendment (the “Heck 
Amendment”) that would “prohibit use of funds with respect to [states 
with legalized marijuana], to penalize a financial institution solely 
because the institution provides financial services to an entity that is a 
manufacturer, producer, or a person that participates in any business or 
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organized activity that involves handling marijuana or marijuana 
products.”149 The former has yet to move through committee or to see 
the House floor.150 The latter passed the House and awaits Senate 
approval.151 Finally, a bill was recently passed by both chambers of 
Congress and signed by the President that severely limited the DOJ’s 
power to prosecute state-sanctioned medical marijuana businesses, but 
did little to address the complications involving the banks.152 
One of the relevant provisions of the Marijuana Businesses 
Access to Banking Act prohibits a federal banking regulator from 
terminating or limiting the deposit insurance of a bank solely because 
the institution provides financial services to a state-sanctioned  
marijuana business.153 The Act also forbids federal regulators from 
prohibiting, penalizing, or otherwise discouraging a depository 
institution from providing services to a legitimate marijuana-related 
business.154 Finally, the proposed bill prohibits regulators from 
recommending, incentivizing or encouraging a bank or depository 
institution to cancel or diminish the services offered to an individual 
solely because the individual is a proprietor, manufacturer or producer 
involved in a marijuana-related state-sanctioned business.155 Although 
this bill provides precisely the kind of protections and guarantees  
against civil and criminal liability the banking industry is demanding 
before it is willing to engage meaningfully with the budding marijuana 
market, it is unlikely to reach the President’s desk.156 The bill is over a 
year old and has yet to make it through committee.157 
More promising than the Marijuana Business Access to Banking 
Act  is  the  appropriations  bill  that  has  already  passed  the  House of 
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Representatives with the Heck Amendment.158 The Heck Amendment 
denies the allocation of funds to the Treasury Department for the 
purpose of penalizing financial institutions for dealing with state- 
sanctioned marijuana businesses.159 While falling well short of 
instituting any specific legal protections that would contradict the “dual 
regime” structure of federal prohibition and state permission of the sale 
of marijuana, it carries with it the implication of accomplishing a form 
of protection de facto from federal penalties.160 Although the 
appropriations bill does not prevent prosecution pursuant to the CSA by 
the DOJ, it does limit the power of FinCEN and the Treasury 
Department to pursue violations of the BSA and relevant federal money 
laundering statutes.161 The discretion of these agencies to pursue these 
violations is much broader and more meaningful without the limitations 
on their funding imposed by the Heck Amendment.162 BSA violations 
are, in large part, the area of greatest concern expressed by the banking 
industry after the issuance of the February Guidance.163 
If the appropriations bill is ultimately signed into law, retaining 
the Heck Amendment in its current form, many of the questions raised 
by the banking industry will have some more solid and favorable 
answers. Obviously, the banking industry would prefer to  see 
something more akin to the full-scale immunity offered in  the  
Marijuana Businesses Access to Banking Act, but, in its absence, the 
prohibition of a release of funds to pursue prosecutions by FinCEN 
could result in a shift in the banks’ attitudes. Unfortunately, at the close 
of the 113th Congress, neither the appropriations bill containing the  
Heck Amendment, nor the Marijuana Access to Banking Act reached 
the Senate, and at this point, appear to be ostensibly dead.164 
Congress  did  pass  a  spending  bill  containing  a  provision 
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addressing marijuana prohibition, but it does not offer any substantive 
clarification concerning the access to depository institutions by the 
industry.165 The Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations 
Act of 2015, nicknamed the CRomnibus Act (a combination of 
continuing resolution and omnibus spending bill) was signed into law  
on December 16, 2014.166 CRomnibus prohibits the allocation of funds 
to the DOJ for the purpose of prosecuting medical marijuana businesses 
in states where it has been legalized.167  However, CRomnibus makes   
no mention of marijuana legalized for recreational purposes, nor does it 
contain any language specifically concerning financial crimes or 
banking institutions.168 Where the Heck Amendment specifically 
prohibited actions by FinCEN against banking institutions, CRomnibus 
addresses the DOJ and prosecutions contradicting state law.169 It  
remains to be seen if CRomnibus will be interpreted to prevent 
prosecution of banking institutions that deal with medical marijuana 
businesses. Even in such a scenario, CRomnibus  will still have no  
effect on the operations of the Treasury Department or FinCEN. It will 
also need to be determined, by regulation or by the interpretation of the 
courts, whether legal recreational marijuana businesses will also benefit 
from the appropriations restrictions.170 Given the lack of direct 
language, clarity will need to be established as the law is tested.171 
While this outcome may be good news for marijuana-related 
business owners who fear federal prosecution under the CSA, it does 
little to address the concerns of the banking industry. There is a 
possibility that CRomnibus could prevent the DOJ from prosecuting 
banks under the CSA, but the BSA and anti-money laundering statutes 
enforceable by the Treasury Department and the FinCEN remain 
unrestricted.172 
Regardless of how any of the relevant legislation unfolds, 
additional procedural and regulatory changes to the SAR and customer 
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due diligence procedures outlined by the FinCEN would also be 
necessary.173 For instance, limiting the SAR process so that it is less 
cumbersome, and providing more robust language in guidelines issued 
by the DOJ and FinCEN could grant greater assurance to financial 
institutions that they will not be prosecuted simply for doing business 
with the marijuana industry, provided that there is not some further 
violation under the CSA. However, changes to regulatory guidance 
cannot possibly account for political shifts that could leave the banking 
industry vulnerable again.174 Therefore, changes in federal guidance are 
only short-term fixes to be used in the absence of new legislation or  
until pending legislation is passed.175 The CRomnibus bill does not 
address the core concerns of the banking industry, concerns that the 
Heck Amendment might have alleviated.176 Likewise, even the Heck 
Amendment only grappled with the purse strings of federal agencies, 
and not the underlying problem of a fundamental conflict between state 
and federal law.177 
Statutory protections may open the floodgates allowing access  
to financial services. However, neither the Heck Amendment, the 
CRomnibus bill, nor the Marijuana Businesses Access to Banking Act 
will be sufficient to curtail the problems inherent in a “dual regime” 
system wherein all marijuana businesses are violative of federal law 
even where the conduct has been legalized in the state.178 The  
legislative changes may also fall short of alleviating the concerns banks 
still may have about engaging in behavior that violates federal law.179 
Until Congress is willing to address the legalization of marijuana, the 
practical reality is that many businesses, sanctioned by state law, lack 
access to financial services to avoid exacerbating the problems of a  
black  market.180      The  federal  government’s  choice  to  place  a  “low 
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priority” status on prosecuting banking institutions that deal with the 
state-sanctioned marijuana industry is given more meaning when the 
purse strings are tightly closed as well. Beyond  these  specific 
proposals, the larger legal problem with the “dual regime” may only be 
finally resolved if marijuana is decriminalized at the federal level, or if 
marijuana is decriminalized at the federal level in states that have 
legalized marijuana.181 Without such a sea change, the legal landscape 
will remain fraught with contradictions and the security of financial 
institutions that choose to participate “at their own risk,” is dependent 
upon the practical realities of underenforcement of federal law.182 
Regulatory changes, rather than the mere issuance of tepid 
“guidance” would also signal greater protections to banks that seek to 
engage with the marijuana industry.183 A shift in funding, similar to that 
offered by the Heck Amendment could prove to be enough of a 
tourniquet to produce an elevation of participation, or it could prove to 
be as lackluster of a solution as the FinCEN guidance has proven to be. 
In the current environment of uncertainty, it will remain to be seen 
whether banks’ eagerness to participate in an increasingly lucrative 
market will outweigh their desire to avoid liability. 
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